On 22 December 2025, Queeny Au-Yeung J handed down an interesting judgment in 華融華僑資產管理股份有限公司 v 李晓鹏 (China Huarong Asset Management Co, Ltd v Li Xiao Peng) [2025] HKCFI 6402 concerning whether s.22(2) of the MJREO bars common law enforcement after a plaintiff missed the 2-year period under ss.5 and 7 of the MJREO. Au-Yeung J answered that s.22(2) MJREO does bar the common law claim (§83).
S.22(2) MJREO
S.22(2) states that “No proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a Mainland judgment which would satisfy the requirements specified in section 5(2)(a) to (e) in an application for registration of the judgment under section 5(1), other than proceedings by way of registration of the judgment, shall be entertained in any court in Hong Kong.”
Under ss.5 and 7, a judgment creditor can apply for registration of a Mainland judgment within 2 years (§45).
An analogous provision is in s.31 of the new Mainland Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap. 645) (§63).
Just over one year ago on 13 December 2024, in China Everbright Bank Co Ltd v China Kingho Energy Group Limited & Ors [2025] 2 HKC 863, [2024] HKCFI 3586, s.22(2) was interpreted (to the standard of a good arguable case) as permitting enforcement under the common law even after the 2 years have passed. Keith Yeung J raised various queries at §38 (§§46-48).
However, Au-Yeung J held that “there can be answers to Keith Yeung J’s queries” (§50).
First, MJREO is modelled on FJREO, which is in turn modelled on the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13) in England. Both s.8 FJREO and s.6 1933 Act preclude common law enforcement (§51).
Second, the policy under MJREO is to set out a level-playing field on mutual enforcement. The time periods in the 2006 Arrangement (implemented by the MJREO) reflected the then prevailing time limit under the Civil Procedure Law Art. 219 on the Mainland, and when the time limits in the Mainland were revised, parallel revisions were made to the 2006 Arrangement. Accordingly, s.22(2) MJREO purposely displace common law enforcement and reduce the limitation period for registration to 2 years (§§52-66).
Third, s.16 MJREO only preserves recognition, i.e. by res judicata, whether by cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel, and does not preserve the common law route. The Court in Lu Yongliang v Bank of China, Dongguan Branch [2021] 6 HKC 46, [2021] HKCA 1048 did not hold affirmatively that a Mainland judgment can be as a cause of action on its own despite being registrable (§§67-69).
Au-Yeung J went on to hold that “Despite my analyses above, it is not necessary for me to make a definitive decision in contradiction to Keith Yeung J’s decision.” (§70) Au-Yeung J dismissed the summary judgment summons, discharged the Mareva injunction without regrant, and dismissed the disclosure summons (§113).
Decision on the Applications
In relation to summary judgment, Au-Yeung J took the view that the s.22(2) Defence bars the common law claim and thus dismissed the summary judgment summons (§83).
In relation to the Mareva injunction, Au-Yeung J held that there was material non-disclosure of the s.22(2) Defence and discharged the Mareva injunction (§92), without regrant (§111).
On the facts, there was also (i) material non-disclosure on the facts (§§103, 108, 110), (ii) the plaintiff had not shown solid evidence for concluding that there is a risk of dissipation (§106)
In relation to the disclosure summons, it fell with the Mareva injunction.
Other Legal Issues
There are a few other interesting points of law.
First, Au-Yeung J held that although Keith Yeung J held that the plaintiff in China Everbright had shown a good arguable case, that threshold is not sufficient for a plaintiff to obtain summary judgment (§84).
Therefore, where a point of law is decided on to a good arguable case standard, such a decision may not be sufficient to surpass the threshold to obtain a summary judgment.
Second, Au-Yeung J dealt with the ongoing issue of whether a Mainland judgment is final and conclusive, and went on to hold that given there is not even a hint of an appeal, a protest, a review or an application for re-trial, this was a “theoretical possibility of protest or retrial” and should not affect the finality and conclusiveness of the Mainland judgment (§80).
Given that this analysis proceeded on the assumption that the common law route is not precluded by s.22(2) MJREO (§71), the decision on this point of law is obiter.
Fergus Tam, instructed by Huen & Partners, acted for the defendant.
For Fergus’ full profile, see here.
The judgment of Queeny Au-Yeung J [2025] HKCFI 6402 can be found here.
